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Abstract
Algorithms were a generative force behind many of the leaks and secrets 
that dominated the 2016 election season. Taking the form of the identity-
anonymizing Tor software that protected the identity of leakers, 
mathematical protocols occupied a prominent place in the secrets generated 
during the presidential campaign. This essay suggests that the rhetorical 
trope of ellipsis offers an equally crucial, algorithmic formula for explaining 
the public production of these secrets and leaks. It then describes the 2016 
DNC leak and Donald Trump’s “I love Wikileaks” moment using the trope of 
ellipsis, which marks a discursive omission or gap in official executive 
discourse.
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President Donald J. Trump has made a public spectacle of his secrets. 
He is infamous for the secrets he has kept from the public: Trump’s refusal 
to release his tax records (Shear, Eder, and Cohen 2017) and his hot-mic 
confession of sexually predatory actions (Fahrenthold 2016) have been the 
cause of much suspicion and outrage. One might also say that Trump 
projects an aura of secrecy onto his allies and adversaries. Among his 
associates, Trump’s secret aura is like a cloud of guilt-by-association in 
which sacrificial scapegoating frees the President from blame.1 When 
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projecting this aura onto his enemies, Trump often leans upon the strategy 
of gaslighting, whereby the accused turns the accusation upon the accuser in
“a deliberate attempt to deceive someone into questioning their own 
perception of reality” (Gibson 2017). In that regard, Trump has been most 
vocal about his opponents’ secret agenda to undermine him, the “rigging” of 
the election, and that former President Obama had unjustly wiretapped his 
home and business at Trump tower (Clifton 2017). Secrets are, in sum, key 
to Trump’s successful lying, especially when he lies for the apparent purpose
of deflecting the public’s glare from his media spotlight.
However, secrets are also anathema to President Trump and threaten 
his authority as executive. In this essay, my objective is to take stock of how
one such secret has been figured, rhetorically. This means that I am less 
interested in the contents of any one secret kept by the administration than 
with the process by which a series of secrets or leaks unfold as a pattern of 
expectation and desire. Perhaps counterintuitively, I insist that Trump’s 
secrets not be understood in terms of the specifics he has conjecturally 
hidden from the public. Rather, the secret consists in the continuous and 
rhetorical production of public doubt about Trump’s ascendancy to and 
execution of the presidential office. As concerns the pivotal moment 
described by this essay, it is not that Trump’s “I love WikiLeaks” statement 
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speculatively marks a hidden secret. Rather, my argument is that the 
suggestive repetition of this phrase at a remove from the context of its 
original utterance signifies a gap that cannot be easily resolved, or a secret 
that is the product of overt contradiction between Trump’s statement and its
recurrence. Taken in this way, the secret is less an object to be discovered 
than a process of rhetorical invention, one that sustains public attention by 
holding out and deferring the secret’s revelation.
My central claim is that rhetoric, secrets, and algorithms have been 
the generative force behind many of Trump’s secrets. The identity-
anonymizing algorithms of the WikiLeaks submission system were a 
prominent part of the 2016 election due to the steady stream of information 
Julian Assange published both from and about the Democratic party. Just as 
crucially, rhetoric and the algorithm share a family resemblance. Anonymous
leaks can only be figured as secrets insofar as they are organized by an 
algorithm-like rhetorical formula. The rhetorical protocols described in this 
essay is ellipsis, which is an important trope in the rhetorical lexicon because
it describes a narrative technique of deflection, interruption, and omission. 
This trope should be of interest to those with investments in secrecy studies,
which addresses “inherently complex” problems of secrecy by secrecy by 
“creating novel visions and tools to expand understanding of secrecy and its 
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charm across intellectual landscapes, genres, and fault-lines” (Maret 2016, 
7). In my retelling, ellipsis produces the secret by marking the long silence 
between an utterance and its repetition as a generative moment of the 
Trump presidency. 
The following sections elaborate on the rhetorical contribution to 
secrecy studies as well as how rhetorical scholars and cultural critics have 
conceived of the relationship between rhetoric, algorithms, and secrecy. I 
then read the elliptical Wikileaks scandal of the 2016 election season. 
Because the secrets engendered by the “I love WikiLeaks” moment directly 
rely upon the use of anonymizing algorithms, the fundamentally algorithmic 
character of ellipsis should highlight for secrecy scholarship stakeholders 
how rhetoric is, beyond its traditional understanding as persuasive technique
or interpretation, also a discursive protocol that orients the public to 
institutional crises of secrecy. Understanding rhetoric in this way is enabling 
because it highlights the roles of discourse and its absence in constituting 
the secret and names precisely the ritual process by which the secret 
unfolds. It is also enlightening because it illustrates how certain speech-acts 
can undermine the very aura of secrecy they seek to convey.  
Rhetoric and Secrecy Studies
4
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Broadly speaking, rhetorical scholarship contributes the argument that 
the production, distribution, and understanding of intelligence information 
into public depends upon rhetorical persuasive techniques or a rhetorical 
process of textual interpretation. In this essay, I will take things in a 
somewhat different direction, arguing with Joshua Gunn that rhetoric 
constitutes the secret as a psychodynamic relationship. 
On the one hand, scholars have argued that secrecy in national 
intelligence gathering and dissemination is rhetorical because such practices 
rely on persuasive techniques leading to deception or subterfuge. One 
example comes from argumentation scholar Gordon Mitchell (2006), who 
carefully traces the polarization of and rule breaking in cooperative-
competitive debate exercises conducted between the analysts of national 
intelligence agencies. Drawing upon the work of Stephen Hartnett and Laura 
Stengrim, Mitchell (2006, 157) also draws attention to fringe “Team-B” 
analyst-groups’ technique of stovepiping, which “involves the inappropriate 
transmission of raw information to intelligence consumers” through 
“channels that circumvent institutionalized vetting procedures.” A separate 
instance of strategic-rhetorical institutional concealment on the part of major
government agencies comes from rhetorical scholars Kristen Hoerl and Erin 
Ortiz (2015, 591), who describe “how the goal of concealing their operations
5
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structured the FBI’s written communication,” leading the organization “to 
strategize methods for hiding the identities of agents as sources of 
anonymous messages.” Even the way that the executive branch organizes 
their public discourse on national intelligence is deeply rhetorical. 
Resuscitating the archaic Latin trope occultatio, Donovan Conley and William
O. Saas (2010, 330) address “the manner by which the Bush administration 
actively courted the gaps between the American citizenry, the rule of law, 
and its own ‘war on terror.’” Whether by way of dissimulation or 
dissemination, communicating intelligence is rhetorical because ultimately, 
persuasive technique underwrites these speech-acts. 
On the other hand, secrecy in national intelligence is rhetorical 
because it relies on processes of textual interpretation and a keen awareness
of absences and omissions. According to International Relations scholar 
James Der Derian (1992, 26) “a rhetorical approach...is attuned to this 
fundamental aspect of language: that often, what is said is not what is 
meant is not what is said.” Indeed, the public communication of intelligence 
is fraught because the intentions of the author are difficult to reconstruct. 
Instead, the rhetorical approach to intelligence “assigns meaning to the 
status and capability of the reader,” who is more-or-less attuned to the 
interests that underwrite publicly disseminated intelligence. Hartnett and 
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Stengrim (2006, 50) concur that “much of what passes for intelligence 
analysis is an inherently contested process of interpretation – it is not truth 
telling, not the collection of certainties, but the gathering of clues and 
hunches, the collection of shards that need careful sifting and cautious 
reading.” The interpretation of intelligence is rhetorical, in other words, 
because it rests upon a foundation of fragments that must be creatively 
reassembled in discourse for the consumption of audiences who separately 
but simultaneously demand appeasement and aggression.2 In the words of 
Cultural Studies scholar Chris Hables Gray (1997, 243), the discursive unity 
of postmodern war is defined by “the metaphors and symbols that structure 
it, not the direct continuity of weapons, tactics, or strategy between its 
various manifestations.” Rhetoric, in sum, describes how discursive 
fragments are wielded to construct an interpretive framework for military 
and wartime policy.
A third way that the public packaging of intelligence information is 
rhetorical regards the psychodynamics of secrecy. The psychoanalytic term 
of art “psychodynamics” commonly refers to the way that speech-acts co-
orient speakers and auditors to a secret as a common object of desire or 
fascination. In his essay on the decline of Masonic culture in the United 
States, Joshua Gunn (2008, 246) argues that the choice to employ a 
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language of transparency “works to erode the inexhaustible secret upon 
which the fraternity is based.” As Gunn (2008, 253) explains, the 
inexhaustible secret is an “object of public formation” that “cannot be 
exhausted of meaning or enjoyment; some aspect of that object must 
remain mysterious and beyond comprehension.” The inexhaustible secret 
places the psychodynamics of rhetoric on display because the choice to 
employ the rhetorical strategy of transparency makes the secret into “the 
cause of renewed public interest” while also diminishing its role as “‘social 
capital’ that provides Masons a sense of community or ‘fellowship.’” (Gunn 
2008, 246) The psychodynamics of rhetoric consist in the way that the 
discourse enlisted to either guard secrets or put them on display constitutes 
a clandestine public or alternately, threatens it with unbinding dissolution. 
The secrets of Donald J. Trump considered here are similarly rhetorical
in that they put the psychodynamics of his presidential rhetoric on public 
display. As Gunn’s account of the Freemasons demonstrates, the secret 
centered by the psychodynamic relationship is one in which the unbinding 
effects of rhetoric are as secret to participants as the deep hermeneutics of 
the inexhaustible secret that they ought to guard. In the present case, the 
effects of Donald Trump’s “I love WikiLeaks” moment are similarly as secret 
to Donald Trump as the hoard of (personal, financial, etc.) secrets Donald 
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Trump may keep. The contribution of this essay to rhetorical scholars goes 
beyond the idea that rhetorical discourse produces psychodynamics by 
arguing that psychodynamics are themselves rhetorical. Because the public’s
co-orientation to such secrets can only be imputed retroactively, assigning a 
name to any secret’s structure of co-orientation is always an active 
rhetorical process – one that requires taking stock of the way that discourse 
functions like a algorithm that institutes a pattern among familiar elements. 
Rhetoric, Algorithms, and Secrets
In the Gorgias, Plato defines Rhetoric as a stochastic art to designate it
a practice that is “neither scientific nor easily calculable” (London 2001, 
572). Today, “stochastic” is less tethered to Rhetoric than to the sciences of 
chance, probability, and prediction. For the computer scientist, “stochastic” 
denotes a subset of algorithms that execute complex protocols based on 
calculations of chance and aggregate massive quantities of data for 
modelling and prediction. Stochastic does not simply have different 
meanings that vary per context, audience, or history. The co-naming of 
Rhetoric and algorithm-writing as “stochastic arts” also suggests that 
Rhetoric and the algorithm may have more in common than Plato or 
programmers might imagine.
9
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Rhetoric is most often defined, vis-à-vis Aristotle, as the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion: the 
discursive, presentational, and situational resources available to an orator 
for moving an audience. Among a certain cadre of rhetorical scholars, 
mathematics is also understood as foundationally rhetorical, employing or 
demonstrative of some persuasive strategy. One argument in support of this
position is that rhetoric is the strategy of invention mathematicians employ 
in their discovery and presentation of groundbreaking theory. Dale Cyphert 
(1998, 88) for instance insists that Kurt Gödel’s famous uncertainty theorem
is also a profound demonstration of a rhetorical paradox in which the act of 
inventing formal rules “undermines the certainty that such rules are meant 
to support.” Similarly, the simultaneous but separate inventors of calculus, 
Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, employed what G. Mitchell 
Reyes (2004, 165) terms the rhetoric of the infinitesimal, a strategy that 
made “a new form of mathematics...possible.” 
Algorithms have also been considered rhetorical for separate, though 
related reasons. According to Chris Ingraham (2014) algorithms are 
rhetorical not only because creative mathematical theories undergird them, 
but also because they engender innocuous everyday persuasion for digital 
consumers. This is what Ingraham (2014, 63) coins “algorithmic rhetoric,” 
10
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which describes the imperfection, uncertainty and persuasion engendered by
public-facing programming upon mass culture: 
[Algorithms] are best understood as rhetorical if we consider that their
outcomes are not empirically inevitable, but rather the product of a 
particular set of parameters designed strategically to lead to a 
particular kind of result. In other words, algorithms implicitly make a 
rhetorical argument for what factors matter in order to persuade their 
“audience” that their resultant outcome is the best, truest, or most 
important. 
Taken at face value, rhetoric denotes a persuasive influence exerted over an 
audience, and algorithmic rhetoric the selection of the “best” search terms or
“truest or most important” input variables. It describes the simultaneously 
enabling and insidious social consequences of the mathematical procedures 
that effect persuasion by intuiting choices for end-users.
Rhetoric and algorithms, finally, have the shared property of 
concealing, revealing, and producing secrets. Cultural critics habitually 
equate secrets with the contents concealed and revealed by computer 
algorithms. Gregory Seigworth and Matthew Tiessen (2012, 50) claim that 
algorithms have three secret-oriented functions: to create “pockets” of 
concealed content, “pools” of intimacy and revelation, and “plasmas” of 
ever-more-widely dispersed and microscopic surveillance techniques. 
Algorithms are also understood to be inherently secretive because they are, 
in Ingraham’s (2014, 67) words, “hidden automated procedures” that act as 
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the “invisible but driving force behind the technologically mediated aspects 
of our current human condition.” The secret life of algorithms ultimately 
seems to have dire consequences for healthy public culture. Ted Striphas 
(2015, 396), for instance, warns that “what is at stake in algorithmic culture 
is the gradual abandonment of culture’s publicness.” Taste-making 
algorithms make the creation of culture a private, patent-protected 
enterprise capable of marginalizing entire populations while “creating … 
associations that resemble publics” (McKelvey 2014, 598) as when 
Amazon.com, unannounced, labeled queer literature as pornography in 2009
(Striphas 2015, 396). As Jodi Dean (2002, 12) argues in Publicity’s Secret, 
finally, algorithms generate what counts as secret by holding out “the 
promise that the answers are out there, that all we have to do is find the 
evidence and make the links and then we will know.”  
To the above-cited perspectives on rhetoric, algorithms, and secrecy I 
would add the observation that rhetoric and the algorithm denote 
fundamentally similar protocols. Rhetoric is not just the persuasive human 
output of algorithmic selection-processes; it is also its own specialized 
process by which the secret, the public’s epistemological limit, is figurally 
constituted. Whereas the algorithmic rhetoric described above denotes levels
of persuasion evident in or resulting from computational design, my claim is 
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that a rhetorical algorithm describes the procedure by which the secret is 
added to a system as the symbol of its deficits. Moreover, if rhetoric too 
often describes the persuasive action of a discernable (i.e. human or 
computerized) agent, my position is that rhetoric, like the algorithm, 
operates without such easily identifiable actors and across a dispersed 
network of signifiers and discourse. From this perspective, individuals do not
so much use rhetoric in their discourse as they are used by it, figured by 
trope as part of a larger, eclipsing narrative. Whereas rhetorical scholars are 
most often prone to attribute persuasive force to mathematical protocols, 
my objective is to foreground the isomorphism between rhetoric and 
algorithm to highlight their shared role in producing the elliptical secret of 
Donald Trump’s “I love WikiLeaks” statement. The “I love WikiLeaks” 
statement returns us also to the psychodynamics of the secret, in which 
rhetoric carries effects well beyond the awareness of orator or audience. 
Ellipsis and “I Love WikiLeaks”
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, algorithm originates as a 
vulgar Western translation of the Arabic name Muhammad ibn Musa al-
Khwarizmi, the author of On the Calculation with Hindu Numerals.1 
1 Phonetically “al-kwär'ĭz-mē,” and later transliterated into Latin as Algaurizin and Algoritmi.
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Separated from the name, the term algorithm retains the following 
signification: “The Arabic system of numbering, [which is to say, a system] 
characterized by a zero” (OED Online 2017b). The etymology of “algorithm” 
also marks a series of crucial conceptual discoveries. Prior to the phrase 
“cypher in algorism” Western number systems simply made do without zero 
(OED Online 2017a). Even among the Arabian mathematicians who were its 
discoverers, zero was a foreign symbol, imported from India and added to 
their existing arithmetic.3 To this day, “algorithm” brings the zero into 
existence as a symbol defined by difference. As George Dyson (2012, 3) 
writes, “to a digital computer, the only difference that makes a difference is 
the difference between a zero and a one.”
In the rhetorical tradition, the trope that captures the zero’s range of 
functions is ellipsis, which captures the paradox of bringing forth lack, 
emptiness, or absence with a visible graphic mark.4 It is most often 
represented as three recurring baseline dots (...) that offer readers “a sign 
of incompletion, suspension, and change of direction” (Brooks 1985, 49). 
Gérard Genette (1980, 40) traces ellipsis back to its Greek root, -lipse, 
“which refers … to the fact of leaving out, passing by without any mention.” 
The rhetorical mark of “leaving out” or “passing by” also fulfills an important 
narrative function: it sutures a story’s relevant scenes, omitting intrusive 
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extradiegetic noise. Ellipsis, whether a break on the page or a cinematic cut,
marks a discontinuity and suspends narrative time (Chatman 1978, 71). 
Even if events are later revealed to have occurred in the time elided, ellipsis 
dismisses these occurrences in the moment as immaterial to the plot’s 
progression and continuity.
Ellipsis has a final function that puts it into zero’s company: it 
furnishes a graphic mark to indicate that a narrative is only partially 
complete. Ellipsis, in other words, adds the secret to discourse in the form of
a signifier of omission, one that is both part of the plot and undermines it 
coherence. This signifier need not, however, be the traditional graphic mark 
(…) but any signifier that signals a lack of subtending narrative cohesion.5 
Joan Copjec (1994) offers an instance of ellipsis when citing Alfred 
Hitchcock’s account of the following scene, omitted from the final cut of 
North by Northwest: 
I wanted to have a long dialogue scene between Cary Grant and one of
the factory workers [at a Ford automobile plant] as they walk along 
the assembly line. They might, for instance, be talking about one of 
the foremen. Behind them a car is being assembled, piece by piece. 
Finally, the car they’ve seen being put together from a single nut and 
bolt is complete, with gas and oil, and all ready to drive off the line. 
The two men look at each other and say, “Isn’t it wonderful!” Then 
they open the door to the car and out drops a corpse. (Truffaut 1983, 
257)
15
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The question, as Copjec (1994, 170) elaborates, is “where has the body 
come from?” By inviting this question, the body emerges as the 
unmistakable signifier for an omission from the greater plot. Like the 
algorithm’s zero, this ellipsis adds a signifier to discourse to mark the 
knowledge-gap missing from it. 
The 2016 presidential election generated numerous elliptical signifiers.
Donald J. Trump’s accusations of wiretapping, for instance, are elliptical 
secrets because of the way that “wiretapping” insistently resurfaced despite 
evidence to the contrary. After accusing President Obama of having 
wiretapped Trump Tower in conjunction with the British government, former 
Obama officials James Comey and Mike Rogers testified in March 2017 that 
no such recordings had ever been made (Lapowsky 2017). Trump’s 
insistence on the wiretapping claim in the face of contradicting evidence led 
the National Review to claim that these allegations were a “self-inflicted 
wound” that dealt a serious blow to the United States’ relationship with 
British government officials (Geraghty 2017). Wiretapping is elliptical, in this
case, because it functions as a signifier of secret omission: Trump’s refusal 
to let go of the wiretapping signifier gestured to an unstated surplus of 
motivation for keeping the topic alive.
16
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A more involved example of ellipsis is Donald J. Trump’s “I love 
WikiLeaks” moment, which capitalized on anonymizing algorithms developed
by WikiLeaks affiliates Julian Assange and Jacob Appelbaum. The ellipsis of 
Trump’s declaration, “I love WikiLeaks,” was initiated on the campaign trail 
in early October 2016: “It’s amazing how nothing is secret today when you 
talk about the Internet” (Hensch 2016). Trump was, at the time, referring to
one of many damaging leaks to Democratic presidential nominee Hillary 
Clinton. That June, WikiLeaks had disclosed information gathered by 
anonymous hackers about the Democratic National Committee (DNC), 
showing that “party officials [conspired] to sabotage the campaign of 
Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont” (Martin and Rappeport 2016). That 
disclosure, timed to coincide with the imminent Democratic National 
Convention in Philadelphia, resulted in the resignation of DNC chairman 
Debbie Wasserman-Schultz on its first day. Soon after, the pseudonymous 
hacker “Guccifer 2.0” claimed responsibility for the leak. News outlets like 
The New York Times (Sanger and Perlroth 2016) reported that the hack was 
more likely perpetrated by hacker groups “Cozy Bear” and “Fancy Bear” 
independently operated by the Russian military intelligence service.6  The 
first ellipsis of “I love WikiLeaks” was thus an omission of responsibility for 
these leaks. Despite accreted evidence that the Kremlin was responsible, 
17
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candidate Trump remained stalwart by refusing to attribute blame, 
shrugging off official reports and casting aspersions upon President Obama’s 
national security experts. According to the soon-to-be president, “I don’t 
think anybody knows it was Russia that broke into the DNC. I mean, it could 
be Russia, but it could also be China. It could also be lots of other people. It 
also could be somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds, okay?” 
(Priest and Hamburger 2016). Candidate Trump was more than willing to 
ignore the 400-pound elephant in the room. By his reasoning, anyone could 
have leaked the documents, and there was therefore no reason for the 
United States to accuse Russia.
Trump’s elliptical omission of Russia vis-à-vis his endorsement of 
WikiLeaks capitalized on uncertainty generated by the computer algorithms 
used to leak DNC data, forming part of what is more generally known as “the
attribution problem.” Among hackers and criminologists, the attribution 
problem describes the difficulty of naming a perpetrator of a cyberattack, 
owing to the ways hackers may obscure their identity or lay false trails 
(Newman, 2016). The problem, when wielded as political argument, also 
injects uncertainty into leaking controversies by making the detection of 
cyber-criminals appear impossible. When Trump stated that he loved 
WikiLeaks, he named an infatuation with uncertainty – specifically, with the 
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uncertainty of knowing who committed the cybercrimes that benefitted his 
campaign. He also celebrated the anonymizing mechanism that made this 
uncertainty possible.7 WikiLeaks had years before devised a solution to the 
attribution problem by anonymizing their submissions through Tor (an 
acronym for The Onion Router), a software that would encrypt whistleblower
identities beyond recognition. As The New York Times reported in an 
interview with WikiLeaks affiliate and Tor developer Jacob Appelbaum:
A Tor transmission these days might start in Addis Ababa, hop to 
Dallas, then to Stockholm and finally Johannesburg...The only thing 
the Johannesburg recipient can discover is that the data came from 
Tor, and Tor has successfully identified itself with no person or group, 
only with ideological incoherence...With Tor, you ''only reveal the 
information that you type,'' Appelbaum says, ''As opposed to all the 
other information that comes along when you use your computer.” 
(Heffernan 2010)
In Assange’s words, “Tor’s importance to WikiLeaks cannot be overstated” 
(Rich 2010). Tor effectively provided WikiLeaks with plausible deniability 
about the whistleblower identities. It did not matter whether it was Russia or
an independent hacker who submitted State secrets to WikiLeaks; Assange 
could publish erstwhile claiming never to have known his source. So too with
Trump. During Trump’s campaign, WikiLeaks was an invaluable asset 
because it afforded him plausible deniability about the perpetrator of the 
DNC leaks. Absent a digital record of the leak’s origin, there was by Trump’s 
19
Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
logic no way to legitimately draw connections between Russia, WikiLeaks, 
and ultimately, himself.8
Of course, algorithm-granted protections of anonymity returned to 
haunt Donald J. Trump’s early days as President. On January 10, 2017, 
Buzzfeed News released a British Intelligence Dossier on President Trump 
that included “specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations of 
contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives, and graphic claims of 
sexual acts documented by the Russians” (Bensinger, Elder, and Schoofs). 
Although the identity of the dossier’s author, former MI-6 agent Christopher 
Steele, was publicized soon after the disclosure, the dossier was itself leaked
after being presented to Obama, Trump, and top-level intelligence officers 
before circulating among reporters (Blum 2017). Although many were 
suspicious of the information, former NSA lawyer Susan Hennessy noted that
“both Obama and Trump were briefed on the report in a meeting with the 
heads of the NSA, CIA, FBI and Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence,” signaling that U.S. Intelligence agencies at least consider its 
contents important, if not altogether true” (Greenberg 2017a). The day after
the leak, President Trump announced his intention to present a “major 
report on hacking defense,” claiming that the United States was simply too 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks and required “as a deterrent against attacks on 
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our critical resources...the unquestioned capacity to launch crippling 
cyberattacks” (Newman 2017a). The March 11 statement was a major 
about-face for the administration about leaks. Even as he refused to 
acknowledge Russia’s role in the 2016 election vis-à-vis WikiLeaks, President
Trump declared leaks to be criminal acts and announced his intent to wage 
war on the cyber-crimes that had left America – and more recently, himself 
– exposed. In the following month, news outlets reported rising use of end-
to-end text encryption apps and, relatedly, leaks from Washington insiders. 
In March, House Select Intelligence Committee hearings about Russian 
tampering with the 2016 election established that leaks were less of a threat
to the Republic than domestically-based leakers. Avoiding the topic of Russia
almost entirely, the convened Committee instead “excoriated whoever 
brought those allegations to the public in the first place” and made glaring 
accusations against top level officials like Director of Intelligence James 
Clapper (Barrett 2017). Ultimately, the hearings resolved little about the role
of Russian hackers in the 2016 election because they returned to the 
frustrating (and by now familiar) problem of attribution: whodunit?
“I love WikiLeaks” and its by-now forgotten celebration of anonymity 
returned as a second ellipsis following the March 2017 “Vault 7” leak, 
consisting of 8,761 documents and a portion of “the CIA’s hacking arsenal” 
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(Newman 2017b). Vault 7 contained Apple and Android smartphones hacking
vulnerabilities that had been left unreported, implying “that the CIA – along 
with other intelligence agencies – has long allowed Americans to remain 
vulnerable to these attacks” (Greenberg 2017a). The leak similarly led 
former spy and convicted leaker John Kirakou to describe the Vault 7 
whistleblower as having acted in the public interest by disclosing “a danger 
to public health and safety” (Ellis 2017). Whatever public interest it may 
have served, President Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions responded
to the leak by telegraphing plans to bring criminal charges against Julian 
Assange (Greenberg 2017b). In response, a jilted Assange tweeted Trump a 
video of his October “I love WikiLeaks” endorsement (Seipel 2017). As 
Trump had portentously declared in October, “It’s amazing how nothing is 
secret today when you talk about the Internet” (Hensch 2016).
The return of the “I love WikiLeaks” statement enunciated the 
senseless contradiction between Trump’s earlier statement that Russian 
hackers were totally blameless for tampering with the election while 
Washington leakers were total criminals. It signaled an abrupt about-face of 
the administration not only on Julian Assange, but on the virtues of leaking 
information more generally. In the words of Steven Aftergood of the 
Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy, Trump’s 
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campaign to purge leakers from D.C. was “a broader objection not to any 
individual leak so much as to the fact of independent reporting that is at 
odds with the White House narrative” (Watkins and Dawsey 2017). Most of 
all, the statement made Trump’s campaign connections to Russian officials 
more prominent. In early July, Donald Trump Jr. published emails via Twitter
between himself and a Russian government attorney regarding promises of 
“very high level and sensitive information” (Diamond 2017). According to 
Julian Assange, once again in the good graces of the Trump family, who had 
advised Trump Jr. to leak the information anonymously through WikiLeaks, 
the public Twitter post made the secret communications “easier to submit as
evidence” in Robert Mueller’s ongoing FBI investigation of White House 
(Smith 2017). Indeed, the whole affair highlighted the open hypocrisy 
between Trump’s war on leakers and his open channel to Julian Assange, 
between his desire for leaked information and his moratorium on 
transparency in the White House. It signaled beyond all doubt that even if 
the leaks Trump sought to prevent were never to be known, the unwitting 
and repeated revelation of his own shrouded connections demonstrated a 
surplus of desire to protect what was hidden, and implied a surfeit of secrets
yet to be found. 
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Ultimately, the elliptical trajectory of “I love WikiLeaks” sutures a story
of secrecy told by and about the Trump administration. Ellipsis lies in the 
fact that “I love WikiLeaks” is a signifier of omission – referring to Trump’s 
omission of Russian responsibility in the first instance, and to the omission of
his own, earlier statements in the second. In that sense “I love WikiLeaks” 
consistently returns as the signifier for the secret. Whereas “I love 
WikiLeaks” initially celebrated attributive uncertainty, Assange’s tweet 
turned the problem of perpetration back on the President by making his 
amorous speech into the conspicuous signifier of his administration’s 
narrative discontinuities. Like the zero, “I love WikiLeaks” is a signifier of 
omission added after-the-fact into political discourse to index its missing 
secret.
The Secret is Rhetorical
This essay’s core contribution is a rhetorical theory of the secret bound
to the trope of ellipsis, offered as a rhetorical-algorithmic formula for the 
secret produced by Donald Trump’s “I love WikiLeaks” moment.  Ellipsis, I 
have argued, describes an algorithm-like pattern of omission that constitutes
the secret as an absence that returns when unspeakable signifiers are 
spoken. Ellipsis, moreover, is altogether as significant for constituting the 
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secret as the anonymizing algorithms that underwrote the “I love WikiLeaks”
scandal. As a psychodynamic function, finally, the trope of ellipsis adds a 
secret to discourse by materializing a gap, omission, or elision between the 
speech-act and its repetition. It is this secret surplus added by ellipsis that 
often operates outside the awareness and against the interests of its 
originator.
Early in this essay, I also suggested that a rhetorical approach 
responds to the call of secrecy studies to “carve out new territory through 
the shaping of theory and definitions” by way of an alternative telling of 
history (Maret 2015, xvii). A rhetorical approach characteristically avoids the
lure of the secret’s content, or the temptation to dive into the specifics of 
what Donald Trump has conjecturally hidden from the public. Instead, by 
examining the way that utterances like “I love WikiLeaks” are unmade by 
their repetition, the rhetorical approach to the secret illustrates how the 
secret is both public and spectacular. Furthermore, a crucial function of 
rhetorical analysis is to offer up a name for what has been missing from the 
larger scene, thereby giving the epistemological barrier erected by the secret
a positive presence in public discourse.  
To conclude, I will offer final illustration of this essay’s core argument 
regarding the discovery of Trump’s secrets. The temptation to discover some
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hidden content in yet another document, source, or signifier is put on display
with the previously cited Christopher Steele report, published on Buzzfeed in
early January 2017. The report offered an account of two separate Russian 
operations: the first, an effort “to influence Mr. Trump” using “an array of 
familiar tactics: the gathering of ‘kompromat,’ compromising material such 
as alleged tapes of Mr. Trump with prostitutes in a Moscow hotel, and 
proposals for business deals attractive to Trump” (Shane, Confessore, and 
Rosenberg 2017). The second “described the hacking of the Democratic 
National Committee and Mrs. Clinton’s campaign chairman, John D. Podesta”
(Shane, Confessore, and Rosenberg 2017). The report did not just connect 
loose threads between Trump, Russia, and WikiLeaked documents; it also 
instituted a profound amount of hand-wringing over the verifiability of 
Steele’s intelligence. According to Forbes “free-market perspective” 
contributor Paul R. Gregory (2017) the details of the report were 
circumspect, rang more of gossip than truth, and would prove impossible to 
verify. Vanity Fair journalist Howard Blum (2017) answered the question 
“how good were [Steele’s] sources?” by highlighting their impressive 
credentials: “Source A was ‘a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure’,” 
“Source B was ‘a former top level intelligence officer still active in the 
Kremlin’,” and Source E, who had “admitted there was a well-developed 
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conspiracy of cooperation between [the Trump campaign] and the Russian 
leadership,” was “‘an ethnic Russian’ and ‘close associate of U.S. presidential
candidate Donald Trump.” In September 2017, Julian Assange took to 
Twitter to settle the issue once and for all, arguing that in the FBI’s ongoing 
investigation of Russian connections to the Trump campaign, Robert Mueller 
had not once “bothered to contact WikiLeaks or me [Assange], in any 
manner, ever” (Johnstone 2017). The argument was that if Mueller were not
supporting an ideological campaign against Donald Trump, he would have at 
least attempted to contact Assange. According to WikiLeaks’ proponents, the
Steele report must be conclusively false because Assange claimed to know 
something about the substance of the leak that no one else could possibly 
know: that the DNC leakers were not Russian (Mai-Duc 2017). Ultimately, at
stake in all this handwringing over the Steele report was the verifiability of 
the dossier and its contents. If the analysis of rhetoric were concerned only 
with uncovering this content, it could to look no further. 
Instead of taking Julian Assange at his word about the contents of the 
Steel dossier, a more careful rhetorical analysis would insistently scrutinize 
what Assange failed to repeat in threatening to out the true sources of the 
DNC leak: any mention of his submission-anonymizing algorithm. The 
ellipsis by which Assange omits his own anonymizing algorithm highlights 
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the central argument of this essay: When we read rhetorically, we refuse 
being taken in by the substance of any given secret (like the Steele dossier),
but instead understand such revelations as one part in a pattern of 
expectation and desire. Assange’s admission of knowing sidesteps entirely 
the anonymizing algorithm should have prevented even him from knowing 
the identity of the DNC leaker. By asserting that he knew the identity of the 
leakers, Assange forwent the protections of anonymity previously 
guaranteed by WikiLeaks and Tor and instead claimed direct knowledge of 
the individual(s) behind Trump’s “I love WikiLeaks” declaration. This act, 
alongside Assange’s hot-and-cold relationship with Donald Trump and his 
family, enables us to ask questions not only about the veracity of Assange’s 
(or Trump’s) speech, but also about the recurrent habits of speaking that are
generative of their shared secret. If Assange can claim to know the identity 
of a leaker in one instance but not another, is it because he has 
circumvented the whistleblower protection he advertises, or because of an 
interest in seeing the connection between the DNC leak and Russia 
disappear? Alternately, if Assange knows the identity of the DNC leaker with 
protections of anonymity intact, then why would they have informed 
Assange of their identity? Most of all, if Assange knows the identity of the 
leaker(s), why would he offer now to out them? 
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Ultimately, the secret is rhetorical because, like the algorithm’s zero, it
is actively and retroactively produced as a mark of omission. Whereas 
rhetoric is often equated with deception (and secrets with concealed 
content), I have sought to bind these terms to the algorithms that 
underwrote and over-coded the secrets of the 2016 election. Moreover, 
rhetoric is imbued with its own algorithmic qualities. It is not only the case 
that algorithms provide transparent access to missing secrets or that they 
offer an expedient route to discovering them. Rather, the algorithm and 
rhetoric both add a new element (zero and the secret) to their existing 
systems to indicate what is lacking from them. In the words of Roberto 
Simanowski (2016, 10), “the algorithm is the psychoanalyst of the twenty-
first century, delineating patterns of behavior that had previously remained 
hidden.” If that is the case, it is because the algorithm is tethered to 
established rhetorical tropes like ellipsis that bring the secret forth as 
conspicuous absences and underreported history. 
29
Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
References
Badiou, Alain. 2009. Logics of worlds: Being and event II. Translated by 
Alberto Toscano. Brooklyn: Verso.
Ball, James. 2011. All the encryption in the world wouldn’t have kept 
Bradley Manning safe. The Guardian, July 16.  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jul/16/bradley-
manning-wikileaks-security
Barrett, Brian. 2017. Russia? Nah. The house GOP goes after leakers 
instead. WIRED, March 20. https://www.wired.com/2017/03/hey-
house-gop-leakers-arent-enemy/
Bensinger, Ken, Miriam Elder, and Mark Schoofs. 2017. These reports 
allege Trump has deep ties to Russia. BuzzFeed News, January 10.  
https://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/these-reports-allege-trump-
has-deep-ties-to-russia.
Blum, Howard. 2017. How ex-spy Christopher Steele compiled his 
explosive Trump-Russia dossier. Vanity Fair, April.  
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/how-the-explosive-russian-
dossier-was-compiled-christopher-steele
Brooks, Peter. 1985. Reading for the plot: Design and intention in 
narrative. New York: Vintage Books. 
Buchanan, Larry, Alicia Parlapiano, and Karen Yourish. 2017. Here are the 
top officials in the Trump White House who have left. The New York 




Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/2
Bump, Phillip. 2017. What Jeff Sessions said about Russia, and when. The 
Washington Post, March 2.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/03/02/what-
jeff-sessions-said-about-russia-and-when/
Chatman, Seymour. 1978. Story and discourse: Narrative structure in 
fiction and film. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Clinton, Hillary. 2010. Clinton condemns leak as “attack on international 
community.” CNN.com, November 30.  
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/29/wikileaks/index.html
Clifton, Denise. 2017. How Trump and his allies have run with Russian 
propaganda. Mother Jones, June 5.  
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/06/russian-active-
measures-trump-propaganda-conspiracy-theories/
Conley, Donovan, and William O. Saas. 2010. Occultatio: The Bush 
administration’s rhetorical war. Western Journal of Communication 74: 
329-350.
Copjec, Joan. 1994. Read my desire: Lacan against the historicists. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Cyphert, Dale. 1998. Strategic use of the unsayable: Paradox as argument
in Gödel’s theorem. Quarterly Journal of Speech 84: 80-93.
Dean, Jodi. 2002. Publicity’s secret: How technoculture capitalizes on 
democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
31
Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
Der Derian, James. 1992. Antidiplomacy: Spies, terror, speed, and war. 
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing.
Derrida, Jacques. 1998. Of grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Diamond, Jeremy. 2017. Donald Trump Jr. releases email chain on his 
Russian meeting. CNN Politics, July 11. 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/11/politics/trump-jr-russia-lawyer-
emails/index.html 
Dyson, George. 2012. Turing’s cathedral: The origins of the digital 
universe. New York: Random House. 
Ellis, Emma Grey. 2017. Convicted leaker John Kiriakou’s got some 
opinions about WikiLeaks and Trump. WIRED, March 14.  
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cia-whistleblower-talks-vault-7-
wikileaks-president-trump/
Entous, Adam, Ellen Nakashima, and Greg Miller. 2017. Sessions met with
Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later did not disclose. The 





Fahrenthold, David A. 2016. Trump recorded having extremely lewd 





Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/2
Genette, Gerard. 1983. Narrative discourse: An essay in method. 
Translated by Jane E. Lewin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Geraghty, Jim. 2017. Trump’s wiretap allegation was a self-inflicted 
wound. National Review, March 20. 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445929/donald-trump-obama-
wiretap-allegation-self-inflicted-political-wound
Gibson, Caitlin. 2017. What we talk about when we talk about Donald 





Glaser, April. 2016. Here’s what we know about Russia and the DNC hack.
WIRED, July 27. https://www.wired.com/2016/07/heres-know-russia-
dnc-hack/
Gray, Chris Hables. 1997. Postmodern war: The new politics of conflict. 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Greenberg, Andy. 2017a. How the CIA’s hacking hoard makes everyone 
less secure. WIRED, March 8. https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cias-
hacking-hoard-makes-everyone-less-secure/
___. 2017b. The US charging Julian Assange could put press freedom on 
trial. WIRED, April 20.  https://www.wired.com/2017/04/us-charging-
julian-assange-put-press-freedom-trial/
Gregory, Paul Roderick. 2017. The Trump dossier is fake – and here are 
the reasons why. Forbes, January 13. 
33
Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2017/01/13/the-
trump-dossier-is-false-news-and-heres-why/#f6716be68674 
Gunn, Joshua. 2008. Death by publicity: U.S. freemasonry and the public 
drama of secrecy. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 11: 243-278.
Hansen, Evan. 2011. Manning-Lamo chat logs revealed. WIRED, July 13.  
https://www.wired.com/2011/07/manning-lamo-logs/
Hartnett, Stephen, and Laura Stengrim. 2006. Globalization and empire: 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq, free markets, and the twilight of democracy. 
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Hartnett, Stephen. 2011. Google and the “twisted cyber-spy” affair: US-
Chinese communication in an age of globalization. Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 97: 411-434.
Heffernan, Virginia. 2010. Granting anonymity. The New York Times, 
December 17. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/magazine/19FOB-
Medium-t.html
Hensch, Mark. 2016. Trump: “I love WikiLeaks.” The Hill, October 10.  
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/300327-trump-i-
love-wikileaks
Higgins, Andrew. 2017. Maybe private Russian hackers meddled in 
election, Putin says. The New York Times, June 1.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/vladimir-putin-
donald-trump-hacking.html
Hoerl, Kristen, and Erin Ortiz. 2015. Organizational secrecy and the FBI’s 
COINTELPRO black nationalist hate groups program, 1967-1971. 
Management Communication Quarterly 24: 590-615.
34
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/2
Ingraham, Chris. 2014. Algorithmic rhetoric. In Digital Rhetoric and Global
Literacies: Communication Modes and Digital Practices in the Networked
World. Ed. Gustav Verhulsdonck and Marohang Limbu, 62-79. Hershey: 
Information Science Reference IGI Global. 
Jay, Martin. 1993. Downcast eyes: The denigration of vision in twentieth-
century French thought. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Johnstone, Caitlin. 2017. The entire Russian hacking narrative is 
invalidated in this single Assange tweet. Medium, September 20.  
https://medium.com/@caityjohnstone/the-entire-russian-hacking-
narrative-is-invalidated-in-this-single-assange-tweet-5f36ad25e0f9 
Khatchadourian, Raffi. 2011. Manning, Assange, and the Espionage Act. 
The New Yorker, May 20. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/manning-assange-and-the-espionage-act
Lacan, Jacques. 1998. The seminar of Jacques Lacan book XI: The four 
fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller.
Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Lapowsky, Issie. 2017. Not even the FBI can get Trump to drop his 
wiretap claims. WIRED, March 20.  
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/not-even-fbi-can-get-trump-drop-
wiretap-claims/
Leigh, David and Luke Harding. 2011. WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s 
war on secrecy. Great Britain: The Guardian. 
Leonhardt, David, and Stuart A. Thompson. 2017. Trump’s lies. The New 
York Times, June 23.  
35
Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-
lies.html
London, Alex John. 2001. Moral knowledge and the acquisition of virtue in 
Aristotle's “Nicomachean” and “Eudemian ethics." The Review of 
Metaphysics 54: 553-83.
Lundberg, Christian. 2012. Lacan in public: Psychoanalysis and the 
science of rhetoric. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 
Mai-Duc, Christine. 2017. Rep. Dana Rohrbacker meets with WikiLeaks 
founder Julian Assange, plans to tell Trump what he heard. Los Angeles 
Times, August 16.  http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-
essential-politics-updates-rep-dana-rohrabacher-met-with-1502940957-
htmlstory.html 
Maret, Susan. 2011. Introduction: Government secrecy. In Government 
Secrecy, Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, 19, edited by 
Susan Maret, xi-xxx. Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited.
___. 2016. The charm of secrecy: Secrecy and society as secrecy studies. 
Secrecy and Society 1: 1-28. 
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss1/1/
Martin, Jonathan, and Alan Rappeport. 2016. Debbie Wasserman Shultz to
resign D.N.C. post. The New York Times, July 22.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/debbie-wasserman-
schultz-dnc-wikileaks-emails.html
McKelvey, Fenwick. 2014. Algorithmic media need democratic methods: 
Why publics matter. Canadian Journal of Communication 39: 597-613.  
36
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/2
Miller, Jacques-Alain. 1977. Suture (elements of the logic of the signifier). 
Translated by Jacqueline Rose. Screen 18: 24-34.
Mitchell, Gordon R. 2006. Team B intelligence coups. Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 92: 144-173.
Newman, Lily Hay. 2016. Hacker lexicon: What is the attribution problem?
WIRED, December 24. https://www.wired.com/2016/12/hacker-lexicon-
attribution-problem/
___. 2017a. Encryption apps help White House staffers leak – and maybe 
break the law. WIRED, February 15.  
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/white-house-encryption-confide-app/
___. 2017b. WikiLeaks just dumped a mega-trove of CIA hacking secrets. 
WIRED, March 7.  https://www.wired.com/2017/03/wikileaks-cia-hacks-
dump/
OED Online. 2017a. Algorism. Oxford University Press.
___. 2017b. Algorithm. Oxford University Press. 
Priest, Dana, and Tom Hamburger. 2016. Trump refusal to accept 
government assessments on Russian hacks dismays former officials. 






Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
Reyes, G. Mitchell. 2004. The rhetoric in mathematics: Newton, Leibniz, 
the calculus, and the rhetorical force of the infinitesimal. Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 90: 163-188.
Rich, Nathaniel. 2010. The American WikiLeaks hacker. Rolling Stone, 
December 1.  http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/meet-the-
american-hacker-behind-wikileaks
 
Sanger, David E. and Nicole Perlroth. 2016. As Democrats gather, a 
Russian subplot raises intrigue. The New York Times, July 24.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-
emails.html
Seife, Charles. 2000. Zero: The biography of a dangerous idea. New York:
Penguin Books.
Seigworth, Gregory J., and Matthew Tiessen. 2012. Mobile affects, open 
secrets, and global illiquidiy: Pockets, pools, and plasma. Theory, 
Culture & Society 29: 47-77.
Seipel, Brooke. 2017. WikiLeaks reminds Trump of time he said “I love 
WikiLeaks.” The Hill, April 22. http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/330052-wikileaks-reminds-trump-of-time-he-said-i-love-
wikileaks
Shane, Scott, Nicholas Confessore, and Matthew Rosenberg. 2017. How a 
sensational, unverified dossier became a crisis for Donald Trump. The 
New York Times, January 11.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-
intelligence.html?_r=0 
Shear, Michael D., Steve Eder, and Patricia Cohen. 2017. Donald Trump’s 
taxes: What we know and don’t know. The New York Times, March 15.  
38




Simanowski, Roberto. 2016. Data love: The seduction and betrayal of 
digital technologies. New York: Columbia University Press.
Smith, David. 2017. Julian Assange: I urged Trump Jr to public Russia 
emails via WikiLeaks. The Guardian, July 11.  
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jul/11/julian-assange-
donald-trump-jr-wikileaks 
Striphas, Ted. 2015. Algorithmic culture. European Journal of Cultural 
Studies 18: 395-412. 
Truffaut, Francois. 1983. Hitchcock/Truffaut. New York: Simon & Schuster 
Paperbacks. 
Watson, Ali, and Josh Dawsey. 2017. Trump’s leaks crackdown sends 
chills through national security world. POLITICO, July 7.  
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/07/trumps-leak-vendetta-
sends-chills-240274 
Wines, Michael. 2017. Rebuked twice by Supreme Court, North Carolina 




Hallsby: The Rhetorical Algorithm
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
1 The ranks of the scapegoats covered by the range of events in this essay include 
campaign adviser Paul Manafort, former economic consultant Carter Page, and former 
Trump nominee for Secretary of State, Gen. Michael Flynn. At the time of this writing, 
the list could be expanded to include Press Secretaries Sean Spicer and Anthony 
Scaramucci, White House advisers Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka, FBI Director Jim 
Comey, Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, Deputy Chief of Staff Katie Walsh, and Health and 
Human Services Secretary Tom Price (Buchanan, Parlapiano, Yourish 2017).
2 The notion of simultaneous appeasement and aggression is especially pertinent for 
Stephen Hartnett (2011, 414), who specifically wishes for his readers to bear witness to 
what he terms “traumatic nationalism,” or “the production of a dual strategy, where 
hostile rhetoric is deployed for populist political purposes at home, in both the US and 
China, while the interests of realpolitik drive a more measured rhetoric at the highest 
levels of government.” 
3 In the words of historian of mathematics Charles Seife (2000, 18), “You don’t have to 
have a number to express the lack of something, and it didn’t occur to anybody to assign
a symbol to the absence of objects.” Zero was a transformative import to the Arabic 
system of number. Zero comes from sunya, Sankskrit for ‘void’, which in Arabic became 
sifr, the term for ‘empty’ (Striphas 2015, 404). Sifr, the zero, also constituted a radical 
mathematical advancement, granting early mathematicians the ability to write fractions 
as decimals, to convert along base ten (Seife 2000, 18).   
4 The operation of adding a graphic mark that symbolizes the limit or ontological lack 
(lack-in-being) is also what some psychoanalytic scholars have termed the logic of suture
or subtraction. The former refers to “the general relation of lack to the structure – of 
which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of” 
(Miller 1977, 39). The latter is “an ontology in which evental excess summons lack” 
(Badiou 2009, 548).
5 Rhetorical and psychoanalytic scholar Christian Lundberg (2012, 3) might call the lack 
of subtending narrative cohesion described in this essay as “feigned unicity between 
signs, representations, and their referents,” which “imagines a unified social field, despite
the subject’s experience of a fragmented social world.” Feigned unicity and the lack of 
subtending narrative cohesion refer to distinct aspects of a similar problem. Whereas 
feigned unicity “purchases the subject an ability to act as if words and representations 
effortlessly stand in for their reference,” a lack of subtending narrative cohesion indexes 
a signifier which persistently undermines the fantasy of its union with a referent.
6 According to evidence accumulated by King’s College professor Thomas Rid, there were 
numerous telltale signs of Russian interference: “[An] identical command-and-control 
address hardcoded into the DNC malware … was also found on malware used to hack the 
German Parliament in 2015. According to German security officials, the malware 
originated from Russian military intelligence. An identical SSL certificate was also found 
in both breaches. The evidence mounts from there. Traces of metadata in the document 
dump reveal various indications that they were translated into Cyrillic. Furthermore, 
while Guccifer 2.0 claimed to be from Romania, he was unable to chat with Motherboard 
journalists in coherent Romanian. Besides which, this sort of hacking wouldn’t exactly be 
outside of Russian norms” (Glaser 2016).
40
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/2
7 In its earliest, most idealistic days, WikiLeaks had intended to employ a wiki-website 
format, meaning that anonymous informants would be able to edit disclosures at will 
(Leigh and Harding 2011, 52). In theory, the site would have accepted any 
whistleblower’s anonymous submissions, which could then be authenticated by a 
transnational audience of “citizen-journalists.”  But this idealistic vision was quickly 
dismissed in favor of Tor. 
8 It should be noted that this was the also case with Chelsea Manning during the 
disclosure of the Iraq and Afghanistan War Logs, during which time both Assange and 
Manning denied having explicitly disclosed each other’s identity. As Assange explained in 
a 2010 interview with George Stephanopoulos, “I had never heard of the name Bradley 
Manning before it was published in the press. WikiLeaks’s technology [was] designed 
from the very beginning to make sure that we never know the identities or names of 
people submitting us material. That is, in the end, the only way the sources can be 
guaranteed that they remain anonymous, as far as we are concerned” (Khatchadourian 
2011). Similarly, following accusations from then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that 
Assange’s 2010 disclosures “puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security
and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems,” 
Assange responded by claiming that such damages could not be proven: “As far as we 
are aware and as far as anyone has ever alleged in any credible manner whatsoever, no 
single individual has ever come to harm as a result of anything that we have ever 
published” (Clinton 2010). Manning’s identity as the perpetrator of these leaks was 
ultimately discovered by Adrian Lamo, a hacker-turned-FBI informant, who secured a 
confession during a series of widely-published chat logs (Hansen 2011). It should also be
noted that the chat-logs undermine Assange’s claim that there was no direct 
communication between himself and Manning; even if Tor protected whistleblower 
identities, Assange is alleged to have known at least some personal information about his
star 2010 source (Ball 2011).
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